

The Occupation of East Baitul Maqdis in the 1967's Six Days Arab-Israeli War: Re-examining the British's Reaction and Policy

Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah*

Abstract

This article re-examines the British's policy and reaction towards the occupation of the East Baitul Maqdis during the Six Days Arab-Israeli War in 1967. As a result of the conflict, the Israelis regime annexed the eastern part of the City which was under the Jordanian's control since 1948. Subsequently, Tel Aviv launched the process of 'Israelization' of the unified Baitul Maqdis by expropriating the Arab's land and imposing the Israelis culture via education and administration means. Hence, this study will analyse the way London reacted towards the Israelis policy and action by comparing the official proclaimed policy such as the statement voiced by the Foreign Secretary at the parliament and at the United Nations with the actual reactions projected. The question on British's actual stand is significant and interesting since Britain played an important role after the war such as drafting the UN Resolution 242 which temporarily ended the conflict. The analysis is relied upon mostly the declassified archival documents from the National Archive of the United Kingdom. In the finding, the article concluded that the British was inconsistent between its official policy and the actual reaction: consequently, this brings into question the veracity of equilibrium and impartiality principle of the British government during the Arab- Israeli War of 1967.

Keywords: Occupation, Baitul Maqdis, Israel, British, 1967's War

Introduction

Elihu Lauterpatch, a renowned scholar in international law had stated that the issue of Jerusalem or Baitul Maqdis is the 'key point' in any initiative to achieve peace settlement in the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹ It is almost impossible to attain peace unless the issue of this holy city is solved, indeed. In June 1967, the Arab-Israeli war erupted again after the end of the Suez Crisis in 1956. As a result of the bloody battle which lasted for only six days, the Israelis troop occupied the eastern part of Baitul Maqdis from Jordan and the Arabs. Despite criticism from the international community, eventually the Israeli government started to annex the occupied territory as a part of her new territory. For the Israeli government, a unified Baitul Maqdis is one of the utmost aims of its political and religious vision since the establishment of the Israel state in 1948.

This essay re-examines the policy and reaction of the British government towards the occupation of East Baitul Maqdis during the war. Although the British was not directly involved in the 1967's war like the Suez War in 1956, London had played a vital role in sponsoring the peace initiative to end the conflict.² Consequently, this essay will analyse the British policy at the aftermath of the war including during the process of tabling the United Nation's Resolution 242 as the temporary solution to the conflict. The methodology of this study is based on history discipline technics which required a process of extraction of declassified government files, followed by an internal and external critics, the reconstruction of facts and narrative and finally the interpretation from a historical perspective. The archival documents examined and extracted here are mostly the records that are recently declassified at the National Archive of the United Kingdom in London.

* Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah (PhD), Associate Professor, School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, Malaysia. Email: hasrul74@usm.my.

¹ Elihu Lauterpatch (1974), "Jerusalem and The Holy Places," in Northon J. More (ed.), *The Arab-Israel Conflict*, Vol.1, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, p. 41.

² One of the vital contributions by the British was drafted and sponsored the Resolution 242 of the United Nations on November 1967. Subsequently, the resolution was adopted on 22 November 1967. The person who played an important role in the process of drafting, consulting various parties and tabling the resolution was Lord Caradon, the British Permanent Representative to the UN. For the drafting process, see Frank Brenchley (2005), *Britain, the Six-day war and Its Aftermath*, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 85-87.

As a brief historical overview, after the first Arab-Israel War of 1948 Baitul Maqdis was divided into three areas which were the West Baitul Maqdis, the East Baitul Maqdis and the Old City.³ Each of this area was administrated by different countries namely Israel in the West, Jordan in the East and the Old City was placed under the international community via a trusteeship of the United Nations. The Old City's area which is the smallest, yet very historic is the most important area. The area which is also known as The Walled City is considered a sacred shrine for three monotheistic religions. The Muslim claims the area as it constituted the Haram Es-Shariff complex (the Al-Aqsa Mosque), whilst for the Christian, it is the site of Church of the Holy Sepulchre that is most valuable, and the Wailing Wall area remain as a sacred place for the Jews. After the 1948's War, the United Nations in the 1949's peace agreement placed the west part of the city under the Israeli state's administration and the eastern part of the city was controlled by the Kingdom of Jordan. The status quo of Baitul Maqdis remained until the eruption of the Six Days Arab Israeli War of 1967.

The Occupation and 'Israelization' of the East Baitul Maqdis

When the war broke out in June 1967, the Israelis troop occupied the eastern part of the city and subsequently the Israeli government merged both areas under the regime's occupation. According to the Churchills' account (based on the Israeli War Diaries) the Israeli commander of the Central Front, General Uzzi Narkiss was on the telephone on the other side of the cease-fire line, talking with Teddy Kollek, Mayor of Israeli Jerusalem at 0910 hours of 5 June 1967. "It's a war but everything is well under control. You may well be Mayor of a united Jerusalem."⁴ Subsequently, the annexation process was implemented towards the Arab's land in the city. In the wake of the Six Days War, Israel annexed East Baitul Maqdis and extended the municipal border. The annexed territory included not only what had been the Jordanian sector before the war, which covered 6.5 square kilometres, but also an additional 64.4 square kilometres of the West Bank villages and some lands within the boundaries of Bethlehem and Beit Jala.

With the annexations, the Israeli government turned two peripheral cities- the Jordanian and the Israelis, which itself covered 38.1 square kilometres- into the country's largest city with an area of 108.5 square kilometres. After the completion of the occupation on 7 June, General Moshe Dayan, Defence Minister of Israel then, had declared that: "The Israeli Defence Forces have liberated Jerusalem. We have reunited the torn city, the capital of Israel. We have returned to this most sacred shrine, never to part from it again."⁵ The following day, the Jerusalem Municipal Council approved a budget of \$USD 5 million from the Jerusalem Fund to restore The Wailing Wall whilst at the same time the Council was given an approval by the Israelis cabinet to launch the Jerusalem Master Plan for the development of united Jerusalem. Consequently, by 15 June 1967, the Israel *Knesset* (parliament) was called to table the new law for the annexation process. The Law of the Amendment of the Municipalities Ordinance and the Protection of Holy Places Law was then endorsed by 27 June 1967. It was followed by The Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) to implement the Israelis administration and judiciary system in the occupied Baitul Maqdis including the Walled City, Sur Bahir area, Sheikh Jarrah, Mount Scopus, Shufat area and the Kalandia Airport. The official legalizing of the Israelis law in the occupied Eastern Baitul Maqdis was officially accomplished by 28 June 1967. The British Consul described the process in the following report;

Under the Ordinance published yesterday (28 June 1967) the area of Jerusalem (Baitul Maqdis) under Israel Law and administration has been extended to include the Old City and area comprising in North Kalandia Airport, in the East Mount Scopus, the Mount of Olives and the village of Abudis and the south a point just north of Rachels Tomb, 500 metres north of Bethlehem.⁶ The annexation of the city was accompanied by the next steps which were to reconstruct the Jews character and identity of the town by expropriating the Arab lands, especially at the eastern part of Baitul Maqdis. Through this process, the Arab houses in the area were demolished and their land confiscated. For instance, a week after the occupation more than 100 Arab's houses were bulldozed around the Wailing Wall area. From

³ The Western part of the city also known as the New City. For details, please see UN General Assembly Official Records (1948) Supplement No.9 – Question of International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places, *Document A/1286*, Annex 1.

⁴ Winston S. Churchill & Randolph S. Churchill (1967), *The Six Day War*, London: William Heinemann, p. 128.

⁵ Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (1997), *The Status of Jerusalem*, New York: United Nations, p. 38.

⁶ British Consulate of Jerusalem, a telegram no. 256- report from the British Consul in Jerusalem to the Foreign Office, *file FCO 17/253*, 29 June 1967, London: The National Archive.

1968 to 1994 a total of 24.8 square kilometres of land were expropriated, out of 70.7 square kilometres annexed by the Israelis after the war. All the expropriated land was in East Baitul Maqdis, and 80 per cent of it was taken from Arabs.⁷ Through the process, the Israelis started to build the Jewish houses on these lands. From 1967 to 1997, there was public construction of 38,350 housing units for the Jews on more than 25 percent of the area of East Baitul Maqdis that was expropriated from the Arabs; not a single apartment for Arabs was built on this land.⁸ The Israelis construction operation could not have been accomplished without a large-scale land confiscation from the Arabs. For instance, a confiscation of land and assets of the Arab in May 1968 was intended to allow construction of a new Israeli neighbourhoods of Ramot Eshkol and French Hill, and to expand the Jewish Quarter of the Old City. Earlier, a few days after the Old City was occupied, Israel had demolished the Mughrabi neighbourhood that adjoined the Western Wall. Another case was in June 1968: it was reported that more than 700 buildings, 50 acre of lands, 437 shops and 1,048 houses in the eastern part of the city owned by approximately 5,000 Arabs were seized by the Israelis.⁹

As addressed by the Jordanian's Representative to the United Nations (UN) on 12th June 1968, a new order by the Israeli Finance Minister, issued in the Israeli Gazette No. 143 dated 18 April 1968, indicated that more Arab lands and buildings in the Old City of Baitul Maqdis were expropriated. The area expropriated is situated between the south-western wall of the Haram-esh-Sharif and the Armenian Quarter in the Old City. It includes the site of the night journey of Prophet Mohammed [peace be upon him] (Al-Buraq), the Magharba Quarter, which was bulldozed by the Israelis immediately after June 1967 conflict, Bab Al-Silsilah Quarter, Sharaf Quarter, Jewish Quarter and Al-Husor Market. All these Quarters were 100 per cent Arab property, except for the Jewish Quarter, which was mostly Arab-owned and Islamic *Waqf*. The area expropriated was also part of the Assyrian Quarter.¹⁰

Likewise, the Israelis regime during the process of expropriation did not only demolish the Palestinians houses but also the Palestinian crops to construct the Jews settlements. The destruction of Palestinian homes and crops started right after the 1967 war with seizure of 20 square kilometres of cultivated land in Latrun salient belonging to three villages (Beit Nuba, Yalu and Imwas).¹¹ The Muslims and Christian communities complained to the UN's Representative to the area, Ambassador Ernesto Thalmann of Switzerland. The Community protested the dynamiting and bulldozing of 135 houses dating from the fourteenth century in the Maghribi quarter, mostly owned by the *Waqf*, in front of the Wailing Wall, which had resulted in the expulsion of 650 persons. They also charged that Israel had evicted some 3,000 Arab residents from the Jewish quarter (also owned by the *Waqf*) at short notice and had taken a girls' school owned by the *Waqf* as the seat of the High Rabbinical Court.¹²

According to a study by Klein, this action had a functional goal -creating a large open space for prayer and mass events in front of the Wall. Yet, it was no less intended to express Israeli sovereignty and to get rid of what had been a physical obstruction to Jewish sacred site.¹³ Suffice to mention, the demolition and confiscation of the *waqf*'s property was a continuous strategy taken by the regime to change the Arab Islamic character of the town and it started even before the 1967's war. Since the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948, the process of 'Israelization' and 'Judaization' was implemented in the city especially after the establishment of the Ministry of Religions in August 1948.¹⁴ In March 1950, the

⁷ Menachem Klein (2001), *Jerusalem the Contested City*, London: C. Hurst & Co., p. 28.

⁸ Daniel Seideman (1997, 17 August), "Before beginning to destroy," *Ha'aretz*.

⁹ Abdul Latif Tibawi (1980), "Special Report: The Destruction of an Islamic Heritage in Jerusalem," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No.2, pp. 180-189.

¹⁰ "UN Document, document A/7017 (S8634), A letter dated 12 June 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General," *United Nations Digital Library*, retrieved on 2nd May 2021, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/516498?ln=en>.

¹¹ Tayseer Al-Shnabli & Jouni Suistola (2010), "Jerusalem and Reshaping the Middle East," Paperwork, 9th METU International Relations Conference, May 2010.

¹² See Thalmann's Report (1967), *UN Security Council, Official Record- Supplement for July, August, and September 1967. Document S/8146*, New York: United Nation.

¹³ Klein (2001), *Jerusalem*, pp. 65-73.

¹⁴ Doron Bar (2018), "Between Muslim and Jewish Sanctity: Judaizing Muslim Holy Places in the State of Israel, 1948-1967," *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 59, pp. 68-76. The term 'Israelization' is referring to the policy of annexing the occupied land under the Israel's sovereignty. Whilst the 'Judaization' is referring to the process of changing the character and identity of the city from the Arab/Palestinian/Islam identity and heritage into the Jews culture and Judaism identity. For example, the regime confiscated the Arab lands and expelled the Arab natives. Then they brought in the Jews illegal immigrants and settlers into the area and subsequently changed the demographic character of the city from an Arab town into a new Jews town and settlement. The term 'Judaization' is similar with the term 'de-Arabization' which is involving the process of identity transformation from Arab into Jewish. For more details of the process and policy, see Ghazi Falah (1989), "Israelization of Palestine human geography," *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 535-536.

Israeli parliament enacted the *Absentees' Property Law* which gave the State of Israel the property of those who left their territory or the territories of states engaged with military conflict during the 1948's war.¹⁵ The law had a fateful impact on the now *judaized* Muslim holy places as it gave the state the mandate to transfer most of the Muslim's *waqf's* properties in Israel to the Custodian of Absentees' Property.¹⁶ Subsequently, when the Israelis merged the city in the aftermath of 1967's war, the process was intensified and expanded to the eastern part of Baitul Maqdis which was under the Jordanian's administration before the war.

In addition, the main purpose of the expropriation was to increase the Jews population in the city: subsequently they aimed to rebuild the Jewish character of Baitul Maqdis. In June 1967, the Israeli government conducted census in East Baitul Maqdis and all inhabitants and their children, amounting to some 66,000 people received the status of permanent residents. Nevertheless, only 2,700 to 5,000 East Baitul Maqdis Arabs were granted Israel citizenship and carried Israel passport.¹⁷ For example, in January 1968 the Israelis regime confiscated 838 acres of the Arab lands in East Baitul Maqdis to build the Jews illegal immigrant houses. Consequently, the Minister of Housing announced in the Knesset on 25 January 1968 that the regime will build more than 2,500 to 3,000 houses in the land for the Jew immigrants. For this purpose, more than £3 million was allocated to ensure the illegal immigrant were assisted to get employed.¹⁸ A research by Klein concluded that the target of the Israelis regime after the occupation in 1967 was to enlarge the Jews population in the city to 80 or even 90 percent by providing incentives for them to move to Baitul Maqdis. Thus, to achieve this objective the Israeli government expropriated the land and encouraged the house construction for the Jew immigrants.¹⁹ For the UN's representative, Ernesto Thalman in his report deduced that the action taken by Tel Aviv was an attempt to change the Arab landscape of Baitul Maqdis: "From the cultural standpoint the fear was expressed that the Arab way of life, Arab traditions and Arab language would suffer permanent damage under the influence of Israel majority. It was also pointed out in the connection that ...the Israeli community might have an adverse effect on strict Arab morals."²⁰

Other than the process of the land expropriation as well as increasing the Jews population after the war, the Israelis regime began the 'Israelization' exercise of the occupied Baitul Maqdis by several strategies. One of the strategies was to impose the Israel's Arab school system curriculum. The Israeli Arab curriculum was aimed at making them Israeli and subsequently eradicating their traditional links with the Arab culture especially with Jordan. Klein in his study indicated that the Israeli Arab curriculum was pro-Israel in its narrative and required knowledge of Jews culture, which was emphasized in the Jordanian curriculum.²¹ For example, the Israeli curriculum devoted 156 annual school hours to the study of Jewish texts and only 30 hours to the study of Islam, as against 360 hours of Islamic literature in the Jordanian curriculum. There was also a practical objection to the Israeli program. Graduates of the Arab Israel system could not be accepted to universities in the Arab World, where most East Baitul Maqdis youngsters preferred to get their higher education. The Palestinians boycotted the school between June 1967 and January 1968, and the public schools were emptied of most of their pupils. Only about 50 percent of students in municipality elementary schools in East Baitul Maqdis continued to study in the municipal schools the following year.²²

Obviously, Israel proved no less inflexible over the question of Jerusalem, with Prime Minister Levi Eshkol asserting that without Jerusalem, Israel was the equivalent of a state without a head. British suspicions as to Israel's intentions regarding the Holy City were first raised when, shortly after the war, it implemented several administrative measures over East Jerusalem. It, therefore, came as no surprise when Israel announced the city's unification. This was followed by a statement which brazenly ignored

¹⁵ "Absentees' Property Law 1950," *Knesset*, retrieved on 6th May 2021, https://www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns1_property_eng.pdf.

¹⁶ Yitzhak Reiter (1991), *The Waqf in Jerusalem, 1948-1990*, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Study, pp.13-14; Michael Dumper (1994), *Islam and Israel Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jews State*, Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, p. 36

¹⁷ Nadav Shragai (May 17, 1996), "The Intifada of Negotiations," *Ha'aretz*.

¹⁸ Ann M. Lesch (1977), "Israel Settlements in the occupied territories, 1967-1977," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 7, p. 27.

¹⁹ Klein (2001), *Jerusalem*, pp. 65-73

²⁰ Thalman's Report.

²¹ Klein (2001), *Jerusalem*, pp. 68-69.

²² Klein (2001), *Jerusalem*, pp. 68-69.

the UN decision of 28th June 1967 which had repealed the act of reunification. Israel declared that the future of Jerusalem was not open to negotiation and that the matter was now closed.²³

The British's Policy and Reaction

To understand the British policy towards the issue of Baitul Maqdis in the 1967 war, it is important to look back at its policy and reaction since the establishment of Israel in 1948. This is because the policy and reaction in 1967 was a continuation of the British's stand for decades. The reaction also could be traced upon several related issues of Baitul Maqdis. Retrospectively, in the UN Resolution 181 (II) dated 20th November 1947 and the Resolution 303 (IV) on 9th December 1949, the UN had recognized Baitul Maqdis as the 'international area' based on the principle of *corpus separatum*. Hence, neither the Israelis nor the Arab has a jurisdiction right of the area which was supposed to be ruled by The Trusteeship Council. Nevertheless, the British government did not recognize the *corpus separatum* status of Baitul Maqdis. In fact, for the British, Baitul Maqdis should be ruled based on either the *de facto* or *de jure* recognition. This policy remains unchanged until 1967.²⁴ Nonetheless, in the 1960s, the British was more inclined to recognize the *de facto* status of the city but undetermined the *de jure* recognition. According to the statement by Hubert N. Pullar, the British Consul-General to Jerusalem in 1964 stated that, "We (Britain) recognize that the two parts of Jerusalem are under the *de facto* control of Jordan and Israel but pending to the final settlement, we withhold *de jure* recognition."²⁵ The same policy was implemented back in 1950s as reaffirmed at the House of Commons in 1950 by the Minister of States for Foreign Affair, Kenneth Younger.²⁶ With regards to the internalization of the city as proposed by the UN in 1949, London declined to support the idea. In a statement by the Foreign Office in 1964, it was emphasized that "HMG have never committed themselves to support a solution of the problem of Jerusalem which involved internationalization of the city."²⁷

After the 1967's war, Britain official policy was unrecognizing the Israelis occupation of the City and Tel Aviv annexation of the entire Baitul Maqdis. George Brown, the Secretary of States for Foreign Affair clearly stated that "HMG's have never recognized Israeli's claim to sovereignty over any part of Jerusalem."²⁸ Endorsing the principle that war should not give rise to territorial expansion, Brown demanded Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories, including the Baitul Maqdis area. Singling out the delicate issue of East Baitul Maqdis, he warned the Israeli government not to succumb to temptation and annex the newly conquered eastern half of the city.²⁹ Nevertheless, in relation to the international status of Jerusalem, after the Israelis occupied the eastern part of the city in 1967, the British government started to soften her firm former position, at least from the Foreign Office's

²³ George Brown (1967, 13 September), a brief for the cabinet, 7 September 1967, file FCO 17/506, TNA, London. A Memorandum by Brown, 13 Sept. 1967, file FCO 17/506 and file FCO 17/505, London: The National Archive. See also Moshe Gilbo'a (1969), *Six Years – Six Days: Origins and History of the Six Day War*, Tel Aviv: Am Oved.

²⁴ Foreign Office's Minute (1967), "Background of the status of Jerusalem," 16 June 1967, file FCO 17/63, London: The National Archive.

²⁵ Hubbert N. Pullar (1964), a despatch from Mr. Pullar in Jerusalem to R. Crawford, 1964, file FO 371/175814, London: The National Archive. As described by the UNHCHR, *de jure* annexation can be defined as the "formal declaration by a state that it is claiming permanent sovereignty over territory which it had forcibly acquired from another state [Emphasis added]. Whilst *de facto* is the actions of a state in the process of consolidating – often through oblique and incremental measures – the legislative, political, institutional and demographic facts to establish a future claim of sovereignty over a territory acquired through force or war, but without the formal declaration of annexation. [Emphasis added]. For details, please see UNHCHR 2018 report (n 9) para 29, in Eugenia de Lacalle (2019), "De Facto and De Jure Annexation: A Relevant Distinction in International Law? Israel and Area C: A Case Study," Unpublished Thesis, Free University of Brussels, p. 24. In the context of British policy, the *de facto* recognition was referring to the recognition of the existing Israeli possession of the Western area and the Jordanian controls at the Eastern side of Jerusalem as concluded in the Armistice Agreement at the Rhodes Island in 1949. Nonetheless, London refused to recognise the legally status and permanent sovereignty (*de jure*) of both countries towards these areas until the comprehensive and permanent resolution achieved. Therefore, the British rejected any proposal to move her embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. For the Jordan-Israel Agreement 1949's full text, please refer to UN DOCUMENT S/1302/REV.1 / Cablegram dated 3 April 1949 from the United Nations Acting Mediator to the Secretary-General transmitting the text of the General Armistice Agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel, retrieved on 15th December 2021, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/F03D55E48F77AB698525643B00608D34>.

²⁶ According to Mr. Younger with reference to Jordan, "His Majesty's Government wish to state that, pending a final determination of the status of this area, they are unable to recognise Jordan sovereignty over any part of it. They do, however, recognise that Jordan exercises *de facto* authority in the part occupied by her. They consider, therefore, that the Anglo-Jordan Treaty applies to this part, unless or until the United Nations shall have established effective authority there". Whilst the same stand applied to the Israeli position in the western part of the City. For the debate, please see Kenneth Younger (1950), "Parliamentary Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 27 April 1950, Vol. 474, cc 1137-41," *Hansard*, retrieved on 16th December 2021, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/apr/27/jordan-and-israel-government-decision>.

²⁷ Foreign Office (1964), a memo from Foreign Office to A. Maitland dated 24 April 1964, file FO 371/175814, London: The National Archive.

²⁸ Morris, W. (1967), a brief for parliamentary question and note of the Secretary of State in a copy to Mr. Brenckley, file FCO 17/253, London: The National Archive.

²⁹ Moshe Gat (2004), "Britain and Israel Before and After the Six Day War, June 1967: From Support to Hostility," *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 54-77.

perspective. The Foreign Office believed that the internationalization of the eastern part of the city is unavoidable and it created the best opportunity for a lasting peace.³⁰ Strangely, from the British's eye, the internationalization was restricted to the occupied East Baitul Maqdis only. The western part of the city should remain under the Israeli occupation as it was since 1948. In a secret discussion with her counterpart in Washington in September 1967, the British strongly objected the internationalization of the whole city. Yet, London had no objection if the internationalisation status was restricted only to the occupied area in 1967 with the western part was to become the Israel's capital. According to the British senior diplomat, Robert Alston: "Although our position on the *corpus separatum* resolution of 1949 has not committed us in any way to internationalization, it seems likely that in the case of Jerusalem some measure of internationalization, will be required to make any position mutually acceptable, which in our eyes the prime requirement."³¹

Although British has its own idea to solve the issue of Baitul Maqdis, London had never clearly declared its official proposal of the Baitul Maqdis's future including in the UN Resolution 242 drafted by her. For the British, based on the importance and the complexity of the Baitul Maqdis's crisis, London has agreed that its policy and reaction must be expressed prudently. As a strategy to project a neutral image, the British government proclaimed that its official policy was to support any solution which could be accepted by the Arab and the Israelis. Based on this strategy, according to the British Ambassador to Israel, Mr. Michael Hadow, London refused to propose "any specific initiative to resolve the status of occupied Baitul Maqdis unless there is a comprehensive solution for the issue."³² In any case, Britain had no doubt that the future of Baitul Maqdis "will be the key in any settlement' and that any rush or precipitate measures would be "likely to block any general settlement."³³

From the archival records it shows that the British proclaimed policy was inconsistent with her actual action due to the consideration of several factors, particularly to safeguard London major interests in the region. These interests mainly were the trade activities, the strategic route, and the cheap oil source from the Middle East.³⁴ Hence, the British must always pretend to be neutral to retain a good friendship tradition with the Arabs and the Muslim nations. Undeniably, there was neither strategic port nor oil fields in Baitul Maqdis, but the city itself is religiously and culturally important to the Arabs and the Muslim World as affirmed by the Foreign Office:

Jerusalem is very sensitive point and we have so far gained considerable credit by our public statement and the way we have voted at the UN. Religious favour on the subject is widespread and the extent of our support for Jordan will to a considerable degree be judged by our attitude towards the problem of Jerusalem.³⁵

In respect of Amman, the fall of Baitul Maqdis into Israel's occupation in 1967 discredited the leadership reputation of the British's ally in the area, King Hussein of Jordan as the 'protector of the holy city'. Subsequently, eradicated the influence of moderate Middle Eastern regimes and boosted the uprising of more radical Arabs. The dethrone of King Hussain will endanger the British, the West and the Israeli position in the region as admitted by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown:

³⁰ Robert Alston (1968), a memo from Alston at Foreign Office to Key, Edward, British Consul-General, Jerusalem, 9 October 1968, file FCO 17/643, London: The National Archive.

³¹ Robert Alston (1968), a memo by Alston, file FCO 17/643, 9 October 1968, London: The National Archive.

³² Michael Hadow (1967), a telegram no. 900 from Mr. Hadow, the British's Ambassador to Israel, Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, 1st August 1967, file FCO 17/236, London: The National Archive.

³³ Foreign Office (1967), a memo from the FO to Tel Aviv dated 16 June 1967 enclosed with in a file PREM 13/1621, London: The National Archive. See also a record of meeting on 30 August 1967, file PREM 13/1612 and a record of meeting with Abba Eban, 5 September 1967, file FCO 17/541, London: The National Archive.

³⁴ For more details of British's interest in the region in 1960s and 1970s, see Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah (2012), "Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-1974: British Attitude and Perspective," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 48, No.4, pp. 589-611.

³⁵ Man, MCG (1967, 17 July) British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, a telegram no. 500 from Jeddah to Foreign Office, file FCO 17/236, London: The National Archive

The fall of the Hashemite regime in Jordan as likely to accelerate a swing to extremism in the Arab World. I must ask Mr. Eban (Israeli Foreign Minister) to consider very carefully what would be the situation for Israel if King Hussein disappeared. The Israel government might be in advantage consider very carefully...to preserve the position of King Hussein.³⁶

Simultaneously, the British's interest in the regions was repeatedly justified by the government such as the statement by George Brown prior to the 1967's war:

The UK stake in the area is still very important indeed to the national interest. Its main elements are relatively cheap oil supplies, a large and very profitable share of the oil operation, big Arab investment in London, and a growing export market. In addition we are concerned to have secure communications by the sea and air to the east; and to deny effective control of the area and its resources to the Communist power. We must therefore persist with every possible effort, within the limitations imposed on us by the situation, to defend this stake. It is likely to be a long hard fight.³⁷

In the 242's Resolution drafted by London, the status of Baitul Maqdis was reserved to avoid adverse reaction from the Arab and the Muslim World community at large. In this context, the British government through its ambassador to Tel Aviv reminded the Israelis Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban to be more rational and 'reasonable' in their action for the long-term benefit. In his letter, the ambassador wrote: "In the long term, the emotional and financial support of Jewish communities in the world will be no substitute for the solid support of the international community and acceptance of their existence by their neighbours, which will be forthcoming only if they are prepared to be reasonable owner of Jerusalem."³⁸

Other than the issue of the Baitul Maqdis's status after the occupation, the British's policy could be understood based on London's reaction towards several issues emerged before and after the conflict. Since 1940s, the British government was extremely cautious in her action to avoid a wrong interpretation that she recognizes Israelis claims over Baitul Maqdis. One of the examples was the British response towards the invitation of the Israelis government for the opening of their new parliament's building in Baitul Maqdis on 31 August 1966. Tel Aviv has invited more than 44 head of parliaments worldwide to attend the event. Consequently, the British government was in dilemma because the Arabs had threatened to blacklist any country which send their delegation to the ceremony.³⁹ The presence of Britain's representative would create anger among the Arab and Muslim nations. In this occasion, British eventually declared that the British's parliamentary members who attended the ceremony were not an official representative of the British government. One of the prominent politicians who attended the event was Sir Geoffrey de Freitas who claimed that he was a representative from The Council of Europe and as the Secretary General of the Inter-parliamentary Union. Meanwhile, the presence of the parliament speaker was on his capacity as the head of British's parliament under the 'parliament to parliament' relationship and nothing to do with 'government to government' connection.⁴⁰

Another example of injustice was found in the controversial issues of land confiscation after the Israelis occupation of East Baitul Maqdis in 1967. As discussed earlier, the regime had confiscated many Arab and the Muslims' lands around the city especially in the Walled City area. After 1967's war, the regime expropriated the lands based of the new law such as the Administrative Regularization Law of 1968 which was gazetted into the Israeli Official Gazette (No. 5452) dated 23rd August 1968. Another law was the Land (Acquisition for Public Purpose) – Ordinance 1943 which was gazetted into Official

³⁶ Foreign Office (1968, 26 February). A telegram from FO, no 300 to Tel Aviv and Washington, file *FCO17/221*, London: The National Archive.

³⁷ George Brown (1967) A Memorandum "British Policy in the Middle East" from Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to British certain missions, guidance no. 151, 16 June 1967, File *OD34/282*, London: The National Archive.

³⁸ Michael Hadow (1967, 23rd July), a letter from HMG's ambassador to Israel to Abba Eban, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs, a copy in a telegram no. 8380 from Foreign Office, London to Washington, 28 July 1967, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.

³⁹ Jordan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1966), a despatch no. S33200/10723 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman to the British's Embassy, Amman, 8 September 1966, file *FO 371/186833*, London: The National Archive.

⁴⁰ Michael Hadow (1966), a despatch no. 42 from Mr. Hadow to George Brown, 15 September 1966, file *FO 371/186833*, London: The National Archive.

Gazette (no. 1443) dated 18 April 1968.⁴¹ According to the laws, the government was legitimated to confiscate the abandoned lands left by the Arab displaced person after the conflict. In fact, the Article 5 and 7 of the Land Acquisition Law allowed the Minister of Finance to confiscate any land in the eastern part of Baitul Maqdis for 'public purposes. The confiscation process was enforced mostly in Jordan's sector of the East Baitul Maqdis at which the majority lands were owned by the Arab.⁴²

With regard to the land confiscation by the Israelis, the British's official policy as proclaimed in the House of Commons on June 1967 stated that Britain does not recognize Israel annexation of any Arab lands through the occupation.⁴³ Hence, as emphasized by the British Council-General in Jerusalem, London's policy was against any expropriation of the land by the Israelis which was contrary to the international law.⁴⁴ Despite the critics, the Israelis Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abba Eban at the same time affirmed Tel Aviv's position that their confiscation program was valid by law based on Israel's status as the *eminent domain*.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, British's Foreign Office refuted this claim by emphasizing that "(Israel) as the occupying power has no right to exercise 'eminent domain' because such a right presupposes sovereignty."⁴⁶

It is worth to recall that since the Mandate's Era, the British government recognized the ownership of the Arab over the land in the Old City. Most of these lands which are mainly the *waqf* land belong to the Arab and the Muslims. Historically, before the foundation of Israel in 1948, the Jews ownership of the land in the Old City was only 3 hectares or 15 percent. The rest of the lands belong to the Arab and the Muslim's *waqf*.⁴⁷ Overall, of the whole 3,000 hectares of Baitul Maqdis area, the Jews owned only 500 hectares or 17 percent whilst the rest 83 percent was owned by the Arab. In fact, the Wailing Wall worshiping area of the Jews stands on a *waqf* land belongs to the Arab.⁴⁸ This fact is acknowledged by the British government. The Lögren's Report by the British in 1931 validated this fact by stating clearly:

1. To the Muslims belong the sole ownership of and the sole proprietary right to, the Western Wall, as integral part of al-Haram el-Sharif
2. To the Muslims also owns the pavement in front of the Wall and the adjacent Maghribi (Morrocan) quarter...[which was] made *waqf* under Muslim shariah law, it being dedicated for charitable purposes.⁴⁹

Later, although the British government refused to recognize Israeli's expropriation of lands including the *waqf* land in 1967's war, London failed to take a firm action in this issue. Based on the archival records, one of the cases was the piece of land in Baitul Maqdis that belonged to Hanna Louis Nesnas. The regime confiscated Hanna's land based on the Land Acquisition Law of 1943. Hanna as the British passport's holder no. C499152 reported her case to the British's consulate. Unfortunately, the British government chose neither to protest to the Israelis nor to defend the owner. In fact, the British through their consular in Baitul Maqdis 'advised' Mr. Nesnas not to prolong the case or challenge the Israeli confiscation. The justification given was Israelis is the *de facto* control of the area and the demand for land is tremendously high for development.⁵⁰ The reaction of the British in this case is questionable, inconsistent and clearly contradicted the country's own official policy which publicly rejected Israel illegal possession of the Arab lands by the war.

⁴¹ Sherperd, J. W. (1968), a memorandum from Mr. Shepherd, Amman to Foreign Office., 26 September 1968, file *FCO 17/641*, London: The National Archive.

⁴² Woodrow, G.W. (1970), a letter from an Arab's landowner, Ratteb Abu Marwan, enclosed in a letter from Mr. Woodrow to Richard Evans, Head of Near Eastern Department, Foreign Office, 28 September 1970, file *FCO17/1368*, London: The National Archive.

⁴³ Morris, W. (1967), a brief for parliamentary question and note of the Secretary of State. A copy from Morris to Mr. Brenclay, 1967, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.

⁴⁴ John Lewen (1968), a letter from Mr. Lewen, British Council-General Jerusalem to Moberly, J.C., Foreign Office, file *FCO 17/640*, London: The National Archive.

⁴⁵ John Lewen (1968), a record of conversation between Israel Foreign Affairs's Minister. Mr. Abba Eban with US's ambassador in Tel Aviv on 1st February 1968. Enclosed in a letter from Mr. Lewen to Moberly, J.C. dated 28 March 1968, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.

⁴⁶ Moberly, J.C. (1968), a letter from Moberly to Norman Aspin, Counsellor and Head of Chancery, Embassy, Tel Aviv, 13 February 1968, file *FCO 17/640*, London: The National Archive.

⁴⁷ Abdul Latif Tibawi (1978), *The Islamic Pious Foundation in Jerusalem*, London: The Islamic Cultural Centre, pp. 10-15.

⁴⁸ Muhammad Adib 'Amīrī (1978), *Jerusalem: Arab Origin and Heritage*, London: Longman, p. 9.

⁴⁹ Lögren Report (1931), "Report of the Commission Appointed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations to Determine The right and claims of Moslems and Jews in Connection with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem December 1930," retrieved on 28th April 2021, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/59A92104ED00DC468525625B00527FEA>.

⁵⁰ Pethybridge, J.W. (1968), a memo from Pethybridge to Consular Department, Foreign Office, 6 March 1968, file *FCO 17/640*, London: The National Archive.

Concurrently, at the international forums, the British government also portrayed a 'soft diplomacy' policy towards the Israelis land confiscation as a part of the annexation policy by Tel Aviv in Baitul Maqdis. On 21st June 1967, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown in his speech at the UN stated that:

I call upon the State of Israel not to take any steps in relation to Jerusalem which would conflict with the principle. I say very solemnly to the Government of Israel that, if they purport to annex the Old City or legislate for its annexation, they will be taking a step which will not only isolate them from world opinion but will also lose them their sympathy that they have.⁵¹

Based on the above speech, it seems that the British openly in public against the action undertaken by the Israelis, and this policy has been repeated in many official occasions. Nevertheless, based on the archival records this study cast a shadow of doubts on the British's actual stand. For example, in the UN Resolution 242, the British drafters refused to insert any critics over Israel's illegal occupation or propose any solution for the future of Baitul Maqdis even though the peace resolution after 1967's war known as the UN Resolution 242 was formulated by the British to end the conflict of 1967. Strangely, London dismissed proposal of any phrase in the text for a firm solution of the Baitul Maqdis's issue. In contrast, the draft by Latin America and Caribbean clearly stated that "re affirm as in earlier recommendations, the desirability of establishing an international regime for the City of Jerusalem."⁵²

Another 'dubious' nature of the British's policy was its reluctance to criticise substantially the illegal expropriation of the Arab lands in the Old City by the Israelis especially around the Wailing Wall. As mentioned in the earlier paragraph, during the British Mandate in Palestine, London recognized that those lands belonged to the Arab. Yet, when the Israelis occupied this area in 1967, London rejected to lambast against the unlawful action. Worse, the British declined to support the international community's initiatives to condemn such action at the UN. For example, London urged the Pakistani delegates to the UN to rephrase the proposal used in Islamabad's proposal from 'condemn' into more moderate word such as 'censure' or 'deplore'.⁵³ Hence, this debatable reaction could be interpreted as an 'indirect support' of the British towards the Israeli expropriation of the Arab's lands in Baitul Maqdis in 1967.

British's ambiguous reaction and policy towards Baitul Maqdis's issue in 1967 is understandable. London was reluctant to criticize the Israeli openly in the issue of Baitul Maqdis's occupation due to the consideration that such action would trigger the Israeli harsh objection. For example, when the Foreign Affairs Secretary, George Brown was on the way to give his momentous speech about British's stance over the conflict at the UN on 20 June 1967, he decided not to insert the British's standpoint on this issue which was "does not recognise the right of either Israel or Jordan to claim sovereignty on Jerusalem." For Brown, the insertion of this stand in his text "would produce a speech highly objectionable to the Israelis."⁵⁴ On the one hand, the British needs to calm the Arabs and the Muslim World but at the same time London must ensure its reaction and policy would not jeopardise its close relation to Israel. Therefore, although Britain had admitted in the 1967's war that it had neither directed nor had a big interest in Baitul Maqdis as mentioned earlier, London could not totally abandon the city's conflict. Granted, the city did not possess any economic profit to London such as the oilfield, a strategic maritime or communication route, military importance or profitable ports like in Egypt or in the Gulf area. Nonetheless, from the undisclosed archival records, British admitted that the issue of Baitul Maqdis is still vital to its position in the Middle East based on several reasons. The Secretary of States for Foreign Affairs, George Brown had emphasized in 1968 that the UK has no direct material interest in the question of Baitul Maqdis, but there are at least four major reasons why Britain could not wash its hand off this matter.

⁵¹ George Brown (1967), a text of speech by the Foreign Secretary, George Brown at the UN General Assembly on 21st June 1967. A copy of the text enclosed in a telegram no. 1458 from New York to Foreign Office, file *PREM 13/1622*, London: The National Archive.

⁵² UN Documents (1967, 4 July), *Document A/L 523/Rev I, (S/8235)*, New York: United Nations.

⁵³ Lord Caradon, a telegram from Lord Caradon to Foreign Office, telegram no 1601, 12 July 1967, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.

⁵⁴ Brenchley (2005), *Britain, the Six-Day War*, p. 55

1. One of our main objectives in the Middle East is the establishment of peace on a durable basis and the solution of the Jerusalem problem must be a key ingredient of such settlement.⁵⁵
2. We have already created a publicity by having a firm position about Israel's virtual annexation of East Jerusalem (e.g. the Old City and other parts outside the walls formerly designed as the Jordanian municipality of Jerusalem, plus certain conditions)⁵⁶
3. Our material interests in the Arab world, and indeed in other Muslim countries make it essential for us to give full weight to the Arab and Moslem interests in Jerusalem.
4. We have more moral responsibility both to the British subjects and others to view of our past positions as mandatory power, to try to ensure freedom of access to their respective holy places for Christian, Jewish and Moslem.⁵⁷

Based on the above reasons, London realises that her peace initiative will not be successful without addressing the Baitul Maqdis's issue in the wise diplomatic approaches.⁵⁸ The status of the Holy City is extremely sensitive to the Israelis, the Arab and the Muslim World. In pursuit of the British's idea of promoting peace through UN's resolution, she admitted the complexity of the issue. George Brown confessed that "the greatest obstacle to our objectives was the future of Jerusalem. We were ready to support them (Israel) in many issues, but they would find little support here if they would not help us over Jerusalem."⁵⁹

The British's assessment was supported by the American as the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk in his letter to George Brown in July 1967 acknowledged the critical position of Baitul Maqdis in the United States and Britain foreign affair in the Middle East.⁶⁰ In fact, Rusk indicated that the status of Baitul Maqdis is the most difficult issue in the peace initiative brokered by the West. Meanwhile, the UK's Permanent Representative to the UN, Lord Caradon asserted that the Baitul Maqdis's future is the most difficult issue to be solved by London.⁶¹ In the dilemma of finding the comprehensive solution for the future of Baitul Maqdis, the British government finally reserved any controversial reaction which could be misinterpreted as a favouritism policy towards the conflicting nations in the June War of 1967. Nonetheless, from the archival record it disclosed that the favouritism element in the British policy and actions was admitted by the Prime Minister of Britain.

British was not seeking to improve relation with the Arabs at the expenses of her relationship with Israel and that HMG's recent mores were designed to protect Israel within the general framework of peace in the Middle East.⁶² One of the main reasons for the British's to refrain any inclination of showing the 'favouritism' attitude towards the Israelis in the public was to avoid an exasperated reaction from the

⁵⁵ For the British, the Jerusalem's problem could not be solved separately but the solution must be work out in a 'comprehensive' peace plan [Emphasis added]. Nonetheless, the British would not lead the peace process plan. See George Thomson (1967, 15 August), Record of meeting between Mr. Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs with Lord Caradon, file *FCO 58/84*, London: The National Archive. Publicly, the British unrecognized the 'territorial aggrandizement' of the City by the Israeli but at the same time, as admitted by George Thomson 'it did not mean that frontier adjustments were precluded as a part of eventual settlement'. See Thomson's statement in George Thomson (1967, 22 June), a telegram no. 3265, Foreign Office, London to New York, Israel Ambassador (Mr. Ramez) called on Mr. Thomson, file *PREM 13/1622*, London: The National Archive.

⁵⁶ In public, such as at the United Nation and at the parliament, the British government declared of not supporting any territorial aggrandizement by the Israelis in regards of Jerusalem's annexation after the June's war. See again a statement by George Brown at the UN in George Brown (1967, 21 June), a speech by British Foreign Secretary in file *PREM 13/1622*, London: The National Archive.

⁵⁷ Lord Caradon (1968), a memo from Brown to Lord Caradon, The Arab-Israel Dispute: Appendix A, 3 January 1968, file *FO1018/130*, London: The National Archive. The 'moral obligation' here is referring to the British policy of supporting the Israelis to establish the Jews State through the Balfour Declaration in 1917 and the British policy of facilitated the Jews immigrations into Palestine during the Mandate era from 1920 to 1948.

⁵⁸ One of the examples was when the British diplomat Lord Caradon drafted the Resolution 242. Although the British policy officially refused to acknowledge the 'territorial aggrandizement' including Jerusalem by the Israelis, but London refused to condemn Tel Aviv's action firmly. Instead, British's stance was "to vote for any moderately worded resolution at the United Nations condemning Israel aggression" Additionally, British refused to insert the definite article 'withdrawal from all the territories occupied by Israel' in her draft text. [emphasis added]. This decision was to avoid strident critics from Tel Aviv. See Thomson, J.A (1967, 12 June), a letter from Thomson to Sir P. Gore Booth in file *FCO 17/34*, London: The National Archive.

⁵⁹ George Brown (1967, 27 July), a statement by Brown- Secretary of States for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the record of meeting attended by senior officers of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office at the Secretary of State's office, Thursday, 27 July 1967, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.

⁶⁰ Dean Rusk (1967), a letter from the US's Secretary of State, Rusk to Brown, UK's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 25 July 1967, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.

⁶¹ Lord Caradon (1967, 14 July), a telegram from Lord Caradon to the Foreign Office, telegram no. 1755, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.

⁶² Graham, J.A.N (1967, 29 October 1967) An extract of Statement by Mr. Short, a chairperson of Anglo-Israel Association, on behalf of the British Prime Minister in the 50 Years, Balfour Declaration's Commemorative, Guidance no. 273, Foreign Office, file *FO 960*, London: The National Archive.

Arabs and the Muslim world. At the same time, British needs to project an equilibrium image of not in favour of the Arabs, or consequently Britain will be exposed to the Israeli critics and the Israeli lobbyist's pressure in London, Europe and Washington.⁶³ Briefly, among the most powerful Israeli lobbyist groups in the United Kingdoms were Conservative Friends of Israel (CFI), Labour Friends of Israel and Liberal Democrat Friends of Israel. These groups played an important role in financing both the Tories nationally, and MPs at the local level.⁶⁴ Whilst in Europe, the groups were represented by European Friends of Israel (EFI) stationed in Brussels.⁶⁵ Obviously, the Israeli lobbyists also influenced the US policy on the Middle East affairs as former US Democratic Senator James Abourezk once wrote, "I can tell you from personal experience that the support Israel has in the Congress is based completely on political fear — fear of defeat by anyone who does not do what Israel wants done."⁶⁶ Suffice to say besides the Arab countries, Israel was also very important to the British economic interest during the conflict. For example, Tel Aviv provided an alternative way to safeguard Britain and Europe's oil import from the Middle East especially from Iran when the Suez Canal closed during the war. For instance, as an alternative to the Suez Canal, in 1969 the Israeli government launched the gigantic crude oil pipeline project which connected the southern port of Eilat at the Red Sea to the Mediterranean via the coastal city of Ashkelon. The capacity of the pipeline in 1970 was 19 million tons and it increased tremendously to 60 million tons per year.⁶⁷ The pipeline was an additional facility to the existing Eilat-Haifa's pipeline due to the closure of Suez Canal since the war. The British welcomes the initiative as stated by the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson: "Although it (the pipeline) could not replace the Suez Canal for the passage of oil, it would have a number of substantial economic advantages in providing a shorter alternative route via Suez Canal and a cheaper route than either the Suez Canal or even the journey round the Cape with super tankers."⁶⁸

Other than the oil pipelines, Israel was also important for the trade activities such as the lucrative market for the British's automotive and diamond cutting industry. British Leyland Motor Corporation Limited (BLMC) was one of the leading British automotive producers who collaborated with the Israel Leyland Motor at Ashdod and Autocar of Haifa in 1967.⁶⁹ Whilst in regards of diamond cutting industry, the value of the industry in 1967 controlled by the Israeli contributed approximately £230 million in hard foreign currency to Britain.⁷⁰ At the same time, the overall of British exports to Israel alone in 1967 was approximately £49.2 million and the value almost doubled in 1968 to £87.9 million. As a comparison, British exports to the major Arab countries who involved in the June's War (UAR, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan) was only £35.6 million in 1967 and slightly increased to £45.3 million in 1968.⁷¹ In fact, the Foreign Office warned the government in 1967 that any action in regards of Baitul Maqdis's solution such as sanctioning Israel at the UN could be interpreted as anti-Jewish, and this attitude will infuriates the outrage of overseas Jewry against Britain.

With the particular emotional relationship of overseas Jewry to Israel since 1967, any ambivalence on our part on sanction would be widely interpreted by them as being more dangerous to the existence of Israel than in fact would be the case. This could have the most serious effect on our trade with the US, the old Commonwealth countries and certain part of Western Europe where overseas Jewry have a considerable influence and part in

⁶³ The Israeli lobbyist pressure in London, United States and Europe was one of the key factors in reshaping the British's policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, including the Jerusalem's issue and the PLO. See Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah (2018), "Britain Middle East Affair: Revisiting the Political Pressures and Protest Regarding the PLO's London Office Controversy," in Mansoureh Ebrahimi & Kamaruzaman Yusoff (eds.), *The Middle East Arc of Crisis: Political Spin-off and Developmental Outcome*, Johor: UTM Press, pp. 79-89.

⁶⁴ Peter Osborne (2012), "The cowardice at the heart of our relationship with Israel," *The Telegraph*, retrieved on 12th December 2021, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/9740044/The-cowardice-at-the-heart-of-our-relationship-with-Israel.html>.

⁶⁵ David Cronin, Sarah Marusek & David Miller (2016), *The Israel Lobby and the European Union*, Glasgow: Public Interest Investigations, p. 14.

⁶⁶ James Abourezk (2015), "Support for Israel in Congress is based on fear," *The Electronic Intifada*, retrieved on 17th December 2021, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/supportisrael-congress-based-fear/6598>.

⁶⁷ The pipeline was sponsored by the eminent Jews, Edmond Rothschild under his company Tricontinental Pipeline Ltd. and the cost of the project was \$USD 136 million. *Petroleum Times*, 6 June 1969, p. 843.

⁶⁸ Harold Wilson (1967, 30 July). A comment by the Prime Minister in a report 'crude oil pipeline from Eilat to Ashdod', prepared by P. Roger, Foreign Office, file *PREM 13/1630*, London: The National Archive.

⁶⁹ Since 1945 to 1967, BLMC monopolised the Israel's automotive market which in 1965 alone invested more than £43 million. For detail, please refer to a letter from George Chalmers (1968, 16 February) to Moberly, J.C in file *FCO17/107*, London: The National Archive.

⁷⁰ Barnes, E. J. W to Hadow, Michael (1968, 5 July), A Chalmers's Paper. File *FCO 17/87*, London: The National Archive.

⁷¹ Mac Rae, A.D.C (1969, 3 November), A report by Joint Intelligence Committee on British Economic Interest in Israel and the Arab World, dated 10 November 1969 and a report from Export Promotion Department's Statistic, attached in a letter from Mac Rae to Mr. Trip, Foreign Office, British Economic interest in Israel', file *FCO 17/787*, London: The National Archive.

banking and retail trades. For example, 40 percent of the hire purchase finance available there were Jewish owned and controlled by people active in the Zionist cause.⁷²

Meanwhile, from the strategic and political assessment, the result of the war with the Israeli victory was very crucial to debilitate the rising of Arab revolutionist regimes in 1960s led by President Gamal Abdul Nasser of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and subsequently the Soviet's domination in the region. As mentioned earlier, this scenario will create a serious political threat to Britain's close ally such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. The British Foreign Secretary, George Brown once admitted the danger of the threat as he mentioned in his memorandum in 1967. The consolidation of the UAR victory could lead to the rapid undermining of the Arab states where our economic interests are concentrated and expanding. Oil supplies would no doubt continue but under the control of basically hostile and pro-Soviet regime.⁷³

Finally, yet importantly the British position on Baitul Maqdis must be consistent with the policy of the Israel's chief ally, the United States. One of the examples was when London drafted the UN Resolution 242 aftermath the war. As admitted by the Foreign Office that the draft could only be tabled after a consultation with Washington.⁷⁴ In fact, from the archival records it revealed that before the voting process of the draft at the United Nation in November 1967, the British Foreign Office pre-consulted Washington and re-affirmed that the final version will neither against the Israeli nor the US's interest.⁷⁵ Eventually, after tabled the Resolution of 242 in November 1967, the British did not involves directly in the Middle East peace process and negotiation which mainly dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. As emphasized by the successor of George Brown as the new British Secretary of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Alex Douglas-Home in March 1974 that "London would not be party to anything which will cut across US peace-making efforts in the Middle East."⁷⁶ Based on the 242's Resolution sponsored by Britain, the UN appointed Ambassador Gunnar Jarring as a special representative to establish contact with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in the Resolution. Nonetheless the mission was fruitless when the Arab-Israeli War broke up again in October 1973, Although the establishment of the mission was firmly supported by London, but Britain was excluded in the mission which solely under the UN's supervision. Ironically, for the British the resolution itself did not prescribe a clear set of steps to terminate the conflict including the issue of Baitul Maqdis. It was only laid down a basic framework within the parties which could proceed, in simple terms, to an exchange of land for peace.⁷⁷

Conclusion.

The 1967's Arab Israeli War prompted a dramatic change in the land status ownership of Baitul Maqdis, particularly the eastern part of the city which was administrated by the Kingdom of Jordan since 1948. After the war, the Israelis regime annexed the eastern part to be merged into the Israelis sector as the new united Baitul Maqdis. Along with the annexation, the Arab lands were expropriated including the *waqf* area at the Old City. This action was undertaken with a claim by the regime that it was done for the purpose of the expansion of the town development. Consequently, the regime introduced various actions and policy involving education and cultural aspects of the city. The action could be interpreted as a systematic strategy of 'Israelization' through character alteration of the occupied City by the invading power, which was obviously against the international law and norms.

Meanwhile, the British government policy as well as reaction towards the Israeli policy in Baitul Maqdis was called into question over its equilibrium principles. On many occasions, the British government failed to take a firm action against the illegal possession and rectification of the city by the Israelis. Despite the British's proclamation of neutrality in the international forums, London's reaction seemed to complement its official declared policy. In regards of the Baitul Maqdis's issue, the inconsistency

⁷² Barnes, E.J. W (1969, 29 May), A letter from Barner to P. T Hayman, file *FCO 17/787*, London: The National Archive.

⁷³ George Brown (1967, 28 May), Memorandum of the Foreign Secretary, file *PREM 13/1618*, London: The National Archive.

⁷⁴ Howard Cottam (1967, 18 November), a letter from Mr. Cottam to G. G Arthur in file *FO 960/11*, London: The National Archive.

⁷⁵ This assurance was mentioned by the Foreign Office to the Kuwait Foreign Minister. See Foreign Office (1967, 18 November), A telegram no. 583 from Foreign Office, London to Kuwait, file *FO 960/11*, London: The National Archive.

⁷⁶ Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1974, 6 March), a note of meeting between Sir Alex Douglas-Home with US Secretary of State, file *FCO 93/497*, London: The National Archive.

⁷⁷ Brenchley (2005), *Britain, the Six-Day War*, pp. 93-94.

between the official policy and the reaction shown by London led to suspicions on the matter of impartiality of the British's policy during the War of 1967. In fact, in the draft resolution which was then known as the UN Resolution 242 prepared by the British, the issue of the occupation and 'Israelization' of Baitul Maqdis was excluded in the text. Furthermore, London also refused to firmly state its stand, and yet it criticized any attempts by other parties to condemn the Israeli occupation and illegal alteration of the Baitul Maqdis since 1967.

References

"Absentees' Property Law 1950," *Knesset*, retrieved on 6th May 2021, https://www.knesset.gov.il/review/data/eng/law/kns1_property_eng.pdf.

"UN Document, document A/7017 (S8634), A letter dated 12 June 1968 from the Permanent Representative of Jordan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General," *United Nations Digital Library*, retrieved on 2nd May 2021, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/516498?ln=en>.

Abdul Latif Tibawi (1978), *The Islamic Pious Foundation in Jerusalem*, London: The Islamic Cultural Centre.

Abdul Latif Tibawi (1980), "Special Report: The Destruction of an Islamic Heritage in Jerusalem," *Arab Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 180-189.

Abourezk, James (2015), "Support for Israel in Congress is based on fear," *The Electronic Intifada*, retrieved on 17th December 2021, <https://electronicintifada.net/content/supportisrael-congress-based-fear/6598>.

Alston, Robert (1968, October 9), a memo from Alston at Foreign Office to Key, Edward, British Consul-General, Jerusalem, 9 October 1968, file *FCO 17/643*, London: The National Archive.

Bar, Doron (2018), "Between Muslim and Jewish Sanctity: Judaizing Muslim Holy Places in the State of Israel, 1948-1967," *Journal of Historical Geography*, Vol. 59, 68-76.

Barnes, E. J. W. (1969, 29 May), a letter from Barnes to P. T Hayman, file *FCO 17/787*, London: The National Archive.

Barnes, E.J.W. to Hadow, Michael (1968, 5 July), A Chalmer's Paper. File *FCO 17/87*, London: The National Archive.

Brenchley, Frank (2005), *Britain, the Six-day War and Its Aftermath*, London: I.B. Tauris.

British Consulate of Jerusalem, (1967, 29 June), a telegram no. 256- report from the British Consul in Jerusalem to the Foreign Office, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.

Brown, George (1967, 16 June), FO to Tel Aviv, file *PREM 13/1621*, a record of meeting on 30 August 1967 and a meeting with Eban dated 15 September 1967, file *FCO 17/54*, London: The National Archive.

Brown, George (1967, 16 June), Memorandum British Policy in the Middle East, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to British certain missions, guidance no. 151, file *OD34/282*, London: The National Archive.

Brown, George (1967, 21st June), a text of speech by the Foreign Secretary, George Brown at the UN General Assembly, a copy of the text enclosed in a telegram no. 1458 from New York to Foreign Office, file *PREM 13/1622*, London: The National Archive.

Brown, George (1967, 27 July), a statement by George Brown- Secretary of States for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the record of meeting attended by senior officers of the FCO at the Secretary of State's Office. file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.

- Brown, George (1967, 28 May), Memorandum of the Foreign Secretary, file *PREM 13/1618*, London: The National Archive.
- Brown, George (1968, 3rd January), *The Arab-Israel Dispute: Appendix A - a memo from George Brown to Lord Caradon*, file *FO 1018/130*, London: The National Archive.
- Brown, George, (1967, 13 September), a brief for the cabinet, 7 Sept. 1967, file *FCO 17/506* and file *FCO17/505*, a memorandum by George Brown, file *FCO 17/506*, London: The National Archive.
- Caradon, Lord (1967, 14 July), a telegram from Lord Caradon to the Foreign Office, telegram no. 1755, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.
- Caradon, Lord (1967, 12 July), a telegram from Lord Caradon to Foreign Office, telegram no 1601, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.
- Chalmers, George (1968, 16 February), a letter from Mr. Chalmer to Moberly, J.C., file *FCO17/107*, London: The National Archive.
- Churchill, Winston S. & Churchill, Randolph S. (1967), *The Six Day War*, London: William Heinemann.
- Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (1997), *The Status of Jerusalem*, New York: United Nations.
- Cottam, Howard (1967, 18 November), a letter from Howard R. Cottam to G. G Arthur, file *FO960/11*, London: The National Archive.
- Cronin, D., Marusek, S. & Miller, D. (2016), *The Israel Lobby and the European Union*, Glasgow: Public Interest Investigations.
- De Lacalle, Eugenia (2019), "De Facto and De Jure Annexation: A Relevant Distinction in International Law? Israel and Area C: A Case Study," Unpublished Thesis, Free University of Brussels.
- Dumper, Michael (1994), *Islam and Israel Muslim Religious Endowments and the Jews State*, Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies.
- Eban, Abba (1968, 28 March), a record of conversation between Israel Foreign Affairs Minister Abba Eban with US's Ambassador in Tel Aviv on 1st February 1968. Enclosed in a letter from Lewen, J.H to Moberly, J.C., file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.
- Falah, Ghazi (1989), "Israelization of Palestine human geography," *Progress in Human Geography*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 535-536.
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office (1974, 6 March), a note of meeting between Sir Alex Douglas-Home with US Secretary of State, file *FCO 93/497*, London: The National Archive.
- Foreign Office (1967, 18 November), a telegram no. 583 from Foreign Office, London to Kuwait, file *FO960/11*, London: The National Archive.
- Foreign Office (1968, 26 February), a telegram from FO, no 300 to Tel Aviv and Washington, file *FCO 17/221*, London: The National Archive.
- Foreign Office's Minute (1964, 24 April), a memo from FO to A. Maitland, file *FO 371/175814*, London: The National Archive.
- Foreign Office's Minute (1967, 16 June), a minute entitles - Background of the status of Jerusalem, file *FCO 17/63*, London: The National Archive.

- Gat, Moshe (2004), "Britain and Israel Before and After the Six Day War, June 1967: From Support to Hostility," *Contemporary British History*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 54-77.
- Gilbo'a, Moshe (1969), *Six Years – Six Days: Origins and History of the Six Day War*, Tel Aviv: Am Oved.
- Graham, J.A.N (1967, 29 October 1967), an extract of statement by Mr. Short, a chairperson of Anglo-Israel Association, on behalf of the British Prime Minister in the 50 Years, Balfour Declaration's Commemorative, Guidance no. 273, Foreign Office, file *FO 960*, London: The National Archive.
- Hadow, Michael (1966, 15 September), a despatch no. 42 from Mr. Hadow to George Brown, file *FO 371/186833*, London: The National Archive.
- Hadow, Michael (1967, 1st August), a telegram no. 900 from Mr. Hadow, the British's Ambassador to Israel, Tel Aviv to Foreign Office, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.
- Hadow, Michael (1967, 23rd July), a letter from Mr. Hadow, HMG's ambassador to Israel to Abba Eban, Israel Minister of Foreign Affairs, a copy in a telegram no. 8380 from Foreign Office, London to Washington, 28 July 1967, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.
- Jordan Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1966, September 8). A despatch no. S33200/10723 from Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Amman to the British's Embassy, Amman, 8 September 1966, file *FO 371/186833*, London: The National Archive.
- Klein, Menachem (2001), *Jerusalem: The Contested City*, London: C. Hurst & Co.
- Lauterpatch, Elihu (1974), "Jerusalem and the Holy Places," in Northon J. More (ed.), *The Arab-Israel Conflict*, Vol.1, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Lesch, M. Ann (1977), "Israel Settlements in the occupied territories, 1967-1977," *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 7, 27-28.
- Lewen, John (1968), a letter from Lewen, J.H. British Council-General Jerusalem to Moberly, J.C., Foreign Office, file *FCO 17/640*, London: The National Archive.
- Lögren Report (1931), "Report of the Commission Appointed by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Island, with the approval of the Council of the League of Nations to Determine The right and claims of Moslems and Jews in Connection with the Western or Wailing Wall at Jerusalem December 1930," retrieved on 28th April 2021, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/59A92104ED00DC468525625B00527FEA>.
- Mac Rae, A. D. C. (1969, 3 November), a report by Joint Intelligence Committee on British Economic Interest in Israel and the Arab World, dated 10 November 1969 and a report from Export Promotion Department's Statistic, attached in a letter from Mac Rae to Mr. Trip, Foreign Office, British Economic interest in Israel', file *FCO 17/787*, London: The National Archive.
- Man, M. C. G. (1967, 17 July), British Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, a telegram no. 500 from Jedda to Foreign Office, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.
- Moberly, J. C. (1968, 13 February), a letter from Moberly to Mr. Norman Aspin, Counsellor and Head of Chancery, Embassy, Tel Aviv, file *FCO 17/640*, London: The National Archive.
- Morris, W. (1967), a brief for parliamentary question and note of the Secretary of State, copy to Mr. Brenckley by Morris, file *FCO 17/253*, London: The National Archive.
- Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah (2012), "Oil, War and European Initiatives for Peace in the Middle East 1973-1974: British Attitude and Perspective," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 48, No.4, 589-611.

Muhamad Hasrul Zakariah (2018), "Britain Middle East Affair: Revisiting the Political Pressures and Protest Regarding the PLO's London Office Controversy," in Mansoureh Ebrahimi & Kamaruzaman Yusoff (eds.), *The Middle East Arc of Crisis: Political Spin-off and Developmental Outcome*, Johor: UTM Press, 79-89.

Muhammad Adīb 'Āmīrī (1978), *Jerusalem: Arab Origin and Heritage*, London: Longman.

Osborne, Peter (2012), "The cowardice at the heart of our relationship with Israel," *The Telegraph*, retrieved on 12th December 2021, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/israel/9740044/The-cowardice-at-the-heart-of-our-relationship-with-Israel.html>.

Pethybridge, J.W. (1968, 6 March), a memo from Pethybridge to Consular Department, FO, 6 March 1968, file *FCO 17/640*, London: The National Archive.

Petroleum Times, 6 June 1969, 842-843.

Pullar, N. Hubert (1964), a despatch from Mr. Pullar, Jerusalem to R. Crawford, file *FO 371/175814*, London: The National Archive.

Reiter, Yitzhak (1991), *The Waqf in Jerusalem, 1948-1990*, Jerusalem: Jerusalem Institute for Israel Study.

Rusk, Dean (1967, 25 July), a letter from the US's Secretary of State to George Brown, UK's Secretary of Foreign Affairs, file *FCO 17/236*, London: The National Archive.

Seideman, Daniel (1997, 17 August), Before beginning to destroy, *Ha'aretz*.

Shepherd, J.A (1968, 26 September), a memorandum by Mr. Shepherd, Amman to Foreign Office, file *FCO 17/641*, London: The National Archive.

Shragai, Nadav (1996, 17 May), The Intifada of Negotiations, *Ha'aretz*.

Tayseer Al-Shnabeh & Jouni Suistola (2010), "Jerusalem and Reshaping the Middle East," Paperwork, 9th METU International Relations Conference, May 2010.

Thalman's Report (1967), United Nations Security Council, Official Record- Supplement for July, August and September 1967. *Document S/8146*, New York: United Nations.

Thomson, George (1967, 15 August), Record of meeting between Mr. Thomson, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs with Lord Caradon, file *FCO 58/84*, London: The National Archive.

Thomson, George (1967, 22 June), a telegram no. 3265, Foreign Office, London to New York, Israel Ambassador (Mr. Ramez) called on Mr. Thomson, file *PREM 13/1622*, London: The National Archive.
Thomson, J. A. (1967, 12 June), a letter from Thomson to Sir P. Gore Booth, file *FCO 17/34*, London: The National Archive.

UN Document (1967), *Document A/L 523/Rev 1*, (S/8235), New York: United Nations.

UN DOCUMENT S/1302/REV.1 1/ Cablegram dated 3 April 1949 from the United Nations Acting Mediator to the Secretary-General transmitting the text of the General Armistice Agreement between the Hashemite Jordan Kingdom and Israel, retrieved on 15th December 2021, <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/F03D55E48F77AB698525643B00608D34>.

UN General Assembly Official Records (1948) Supplement No.9 – Question of International Regime for the Jerusalem Area and Protection of the Holy Places, *Document A/1286*, Annex 1.

Wilson, Harold (1967, 30 July), a comment by the Prime Minister in a report 'Crude oil pipeline from Eilat to Ashdod', prepared by P. Roger, Foreign Office, file *PREM 13/1630*, London: The National Archive.

Woodrow, G. W. (1970, 28 September), a letter from an Arab's landowner, Ratteb Abu Marwan, enclosed in a letter from Woodrow, G.W to Richard Evans, Head of Near Eastern Department, FO, file *FCO17/1368*, London: The National Archive.

Younger, Kenneth (1950), "Parliamentary Hansard, House of Commons Debates, 27 April 1950, Vol. 474, cc 1137-41," *Hansard*, retrieved on 16th December 2021, <http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1950/apr/27/jordan-and-israel-government-decision>.

